A good year for al Qaeda in Pakistan

Two thousand and thirteen was a good year for al Qaeda. The network grew on several fronts, including in Syria, where it has become a force to be reckoned with among the constellation of opposition groups fighting the Assad government, and in Iraq, where it has unleashed violence on a level unseen since the worst periods of the Iraq War in 2006-7. Pakistan, however, is the one theater of jihad where those who subscribe to the “al Qaeda is defeated” mantra continue to point.

Al Qaeda in Pakistan is on the ropes, or so the trope goes. Supporters of the idea claim that regardless of the network’s health in other parts of the world, al Qaeda in Pakistan (usually taken to mean al Qaeda “Core,” or the organization that existed on September 11, 2001) is incapable of planning or conducting major attacks due to the beating its senior leadership has taken from drones in Pakistan’s tribal areas. While the al Qaeda of 2001 may have suffered lasting damage, the network is not static and has evolved beyond the traditional reliance on a core cadre of co-located, hierarchically-organized senior leaders. Al Qaeda Core has not only replaced deceased leaders but has morphed to rely heavily on local operatives and militant groups such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to support its operational arm. Recent events in Pakistan and a revised understanding of how the al Qaeda network operates should force reflection on whether the picture of a neutered al Qaeda is really accurate.

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