5 questions every presidential candidate should answer: Yemen edition

Saudi fighter jets bombed al Houthi military positions in Yemen overnight. A Saudi-led coalition pits the Gulf States (except Oman), Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey, and others against the Iranian-backed al Houthis under Operation Decisive Storm. President Barack Obama authorized US logistical and intelligence support for the operation. As Yemen descends further into chaos, the question is whether the US will be able to prevent another terrorist attack from within the country.

Followers of the Shi’ite Houthi group wave their weapons as they gather at the group’s camp near Sanaa September 10, 2014.

President Obama has repeatedly touted Yemen as his model for a successful counterterrorism strategy. Its low-cost approach and extremely limited US footprint are appealing; and it relies on the administration’s favorite counter-terrorism tool: airstrikes.

Recognizing the failure of the model in Yemen would call the administration’s entire counter-terrorism approach into question. It’s no surprise, then, that the White House continues to say that Yemen is a success despite the complete collapse of the country, the rise of Iranian influence there, the regrowth of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and the emergence of an ISIS splinter group.

Since President Obama’s remarks last June and again in September, a coup forcibly replaced America’s legitimate counter-terrorism partner in Yemen, President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, with the Iranian-backed al Houthi movement. The al Houthi takeover effectively ended intelligence-sharing with Yemeni organizations, military cooperation, and military training and launched a civil war, which Hadi is losing. The US closed its embassy in Sana’a in February. It withdrew its remaining personnel from al Anad airbase in Lahij governorate after an ISIS attack in the capital and there have been reports of ISIS militants in Lahij. The al Houthis seized the airbase within days and advanced on Hadi’s positions. And yet, White House spokesman Josh Earnest continued to point to Yemen as a “template,” even when pressed after Hadi fled the country, and again after the start of Saudi airstrikes. If this is success, what would failure look like?

Any prospective 2016 candidate should seek to answer these questions when considering America’s counterterrorism strategy in Yemen:

 How much risk to US national security are you willing to accept in order to avoid involvement in Yemen? 

Closing the US Embassy in Sana’a came at a price: a reduction in intelligence collection capabilities and lost insight into the dynamics in the capital. So, too, will the decision to withdraw all remaining US personnel from Yemen. The US presence at al Anad, a key military base for US counterterrorism operations in Yemen, may have been a factor that prevented the al Houthis from trying to take the base to begin with. Now, it appears that the American retreat from al Anad may have been a factor in the al Houthis’ push into Aden, where Hadi had holed up. The dynamics shifted rapidly, and the US has been caught reacting to events. There is also no longer a partner on the ground in Yemen. Instead, the US has abandoned it to the al Houthis, AQAP, and also ISIS—an Iranian-backed force and two terrorist groups. The risk now is one of an intelligence black hole. AQAP continues to plot against the United States actively. Our ability to understand and interrupt those plots is being severely degraded. Can we count on stopping them at our borders?

 Who is our counterterrorism partner in Yemen?

We no longer have one. The partner had been the Hadi-led government in Yemen, and the US worked through Yemeni institutions. There’s not much left of either right now, and what remains is under the al Houthis, who refuse to talk to Americans. Their presence outside of north Yemen is also driving conflict since the population where AQAP operates sees the al Houthis almost as foreigners and is starting to align with AQAP to prevent al Houthi expansion rather than fighting against AQAP on behalf of the al Houthis. That leaves developing a relationship with independent Yemeni military units or working with local militia forces, such as the popular committees that fought al Qaeda in 2012 or regional allies, who are already juggling Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Egypt. Neither is feasible in the current circumstances without some American presence on the ground in Yemen.

 What role should the US play in finding a solution to Yemen’s current crisis?

The problems in Yemen are locally driven and most directly affect the Yemeni population. But that does not make Yemen’s internal crises purely local issues without regional and global implications. Take the rise of the al Houthi movement, for example. The al Houthis fought six wars with the Yemeni state off and on from 2004 to 2010. Their grievances of economic and political marginalization were legitimate. But they carried out a coup in Yemen and have now publicly sidled up to Iran. The Gulf States see developments in Yemen through the prism of Iran’s expanding and subversive influence. They are reacting accordingly. So, should the US be more active in bringing leverage to bear against various Yemeni stakeholders in order to resolve the issues or watch passively as the ethno-sectarian conflict takes firm hold in yet another Middle Eastern country?

 Why not just let them fight it out in Yemen? They’re not fighting us.

It is easy to look at the conflict in Yemen and dismiss it as one about which the US does not need to care. The Zaydi Shi’a al Houthis, backed by Iran, are fighting Sunnis, backed by the Gulf States, and they’re also fighting AQAP. The Shi’a and Sunni have been fighting each other for centuries—except they haven’t been fighting in Yemen, where sectarianism has been a somewhat foreign concept. The conflict today is not just one about who is in charge of Yemen’s central government. It is now about Saudi Arabia, Iran, and regional power dynamics. The Gulf States will not let Iran win in Yemen, proven by their willingness to get involved militarily. A war in Yemen throws what’s left of the Middle East as we knew it into a multi-front war. The US is already on different sides of that war on different fronts. It is reportedly providing intelligence to the Saudi air campaign in Yemen targeting the Iranian-backed al Houthis and it is providing air cover in Iraq to the Iranian Islamic Republic Guard Corps in Tikrit against ISIS.

 What would the US want Yemen to look like?

Returning to what Yemen was in before the Arab Spring, immediately post-Arab Spring, or even in early 2014 is impossible. The US State Department and administration officials consistently message that the US supports a unitary Yemeni state. A unified Yemen is probably the most stable configuration, though it is necessary to recognize the historical regional identities that persist in the country. A federal state with highly autonomous regions might be possible, although events in other sectarian-riven lands in the region to accomplish federalism are not encouraging about its feasibility or stability. American national interests, in any case, require that all of Yemen be governed by one or several groups that are committed to and effective in the fight against al Qaeda and ISIS, and that are not controlled by Iran.

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