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Iran turned its back on Maliki. So now what?

AEIdeas

Iran’s endorsement of Haider al-Abadi to become the next Iraqi Prime Minister was a fairly dramatic development on Tuesday, sealing the fate of Nouri al-Maliki. The direct role Iran played in the nomination of Abadi is still unclear, though very senior political figures, from the Chairman of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Ali Shamkhani to Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani to the Iranian President himself Hassan Rouhani, have been actively engaged in the process.

The failures of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Maliki during the crisis with the Islamic State likely reinforced Tehran’s view of the prime minister as difficult, divisive and increasingly ineffective. Shoring up Iraq and defending its homeland against the marching Sunni extremists of the Islamic State is an absolute imperative for Iran. Unlike with its other failed ally in Damascus – the strategically and operationally incompetent Syrian President Bashar al Assad – Iran had options in other potential new leaders in Baghdad. Iran was ultimately game to dump Maliki despite its years of investment in him and his government. Al-Abadi is an interesting choice given he is an establishment Shia political figure, exiled under Saddam Hussein, and seen as a relatively non-threatening and independent actor to which neither the US nor Iran nor the Kurds could ultimately object. These exact same factors, however, shaped the decision to choose Maliki in the first place in 2006. Here’s to hoping this will be a good step forward and not déjà vu!

The political situation in Iraq is still far from settled. So what is Iran looking for now?

  • Commander Soleimani will want to quickly move forward in re-energizing his and the Iraqi security forces to fight the Islamic State, defend Iran’s borders, prepare for a push against Baghdad and protect the Shia shrines.
  • Tehran will fight Kurdish independence tooth and nail. An independent Kurdistan is a dire threat to Iran’s internal instability, which explains why Tehran wants to facilitate a swift resolution to the political crisis and to avoid a breakup of the Iraqi state.
  • Iran will resist any attempts to rollback the enormous infrastructure of proxies, partners and affiliated Shia militias it has built in Iraq in the past decade as part of its Resistance front against the US, Israel and its allies. Soleimani will be especially protective of the new integrated units he has formed with the ISF during the fight against the Islamic State.
  • Tehran must ensure it remains the dominant foreign player in Baghdad. Before Saddam Hussein was toppled, Iraq had been an existential threat to Iran for decades, so it won’t let Iraq outside of its orbit of influence now.
  • Though tacit cooperation may have been necessary to replace Maliki, Iran will be loathe to allow a more permanent return of significant US influence to Baghdad.

Iraq is an existential issue for Iran and, therefore, Tehran may be willing to aggressively manipulate — or even sabotage — Baghdad’s political transition process if it is heading in the wrong direction. Iraqi political leaders, the US and our regional allies should be very cognizant of the lengths Iran will go to defend its interests. One hopes the US remembers only some of these interests coincide with ours.

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Discussion (1 comment)

  1. B Cole says:

    Egads. So our “friends”-the Saudis, the Qataris, the Kuwaitees, are financing Sunni hillbilly extremists in Iraq, while Iran is a stabilizing influence. Maybe we should just stay home.

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