Spillover from Mali

In a major speech today, President Barack Obama justified the continued use of targeted strikes to combat the al Qaeda network, adding that another part of America’s strategy is to address the underlying grievances that allow groups within the network to grow. Missing though, is whether the U.S. will provide substantial military assistance and support to the states that are actually engaged in fighting al Qaeda’s affiliates and associated movements. Terror attacks today in West Africa and rising regional instability underscore many of the challenges faced by those countries that have joined the U.S. in the fight against the al Qaeda network.

A coordinated attack on a Nigerien army base in Agadez, Niger, and on a French-run uranium mine in Arlit, Niger, killed at least 19 people this morning. The militants hit the army base first with a suicide car bomb, and then struck the Somair uranium mine about 30 minutes later. A militant is reportedly holding hostage several officers-in-training in Agadez as well. The french newspaper Le Monde reported in late January that France was deploying Special Operations forces to French-run uranium mines in Niger following the January 16 attack on the gas facility in In Amenas, Algeria. France’s military intervention in north Mali has elicited multiple threats from the militant Islamist groups operating in the region against French interests.

The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa* (MUJWA), a militant Islamist group associated with al Qaeda’s regional affiliate, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), claimed responsibility for today’s attack in a statement to the AFP: “Thanks to Allah, we have carried out two operations against the enemies of Islam in Niger…. We attacked France and Niger for its cooperation with France in the war against sharia.” Niger has assisted the French military in its operations in Mali and has troops deployed in Mali.

This attack was MUJWA’s first one outside of Mali’s borders, raising immediate concerns of the spillover of violence from Mali and long-term concerns of the effectiveness of the strategy in place to combat the militant Islamist groups (AQIM, MUJWA, and Ansar al Din) operating in Mali. France is in the process of drawing down the number of troops deployed in Mali, transitioning responsibilities to regional forces under an African-led military mission (AFISMA) and a UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA). A small French contingent will remain in Mali to continue to conduct counter-terrorism operations.

But whether regional militaries have the capacity to fully support operations in Mali is not clear. Nigeria, one of the troop-contributing countries to AFISMA, recently launched a military operation in its northeast province against a militant Islamist group there, Boko Haram, which reportedly controls territory around Lake Chad. Yesterday, Nigeria asked Niger to assist in that offensive. Chad, which has troops in Mali, will also be concerned about its southern border with Nigeria. If regional militaries cannot support the military mission in Mali, it is unknown who will take their place. And if no one steps in, then is there an effective strategy in place to reduce AQIM’s operating space?

It is time to start seriously considering the answers to questions I posed on Mali in January: How committed are the French to the fight in Mali? Will AFISMA troops have the necessary capabilities? Will regional countries fulfill and hold to their troop commitments? And how will the underlying issues that led to the permissive environment in Mali be addressed?

If satisfactory answers to these questions are not found, then al Qaeda’s reach in West Africa will spread along with its ability to plan and conduct attacks on Americans.

* The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) is also known by its French acronym, MUJAO (Mouvement pour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest). Its Arabic-language name is Jama’at al Tawhid wa al Jihad fi Gharb Afriqiya.