India Has a Lot to Lose in Ukraine

For a country that aspires to be a global power, India sometimes makes shortsighted decisions. On Monday it joined Kenya and Gabon in abstaining from a United Nations Security Council vote to discuss the Russian military threat to Ukraine. Ten nations supported the successful American initiative, and only China joined Russia in opposing it. But though the abstention may appear sensible—why take sides in a far-off conflict?—the wider consequences of possible Russian aggression put India at real risk.

At first glance, the case for New Delhi not taking sides in a standoff between Washington and Moscow is straightforward. India shares no border with Russia or Ukraine. How they settle their problems is of no obvious concern to New Delhi, and many Indians support trying to walk a tightrope between Russian and U.S. interests. While India’s security ties with the West have strengthened over the past two decades, Moscow is still India’s largest arms supplier by far. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates that Russia accounted for nearly half of India’s arms imports between 2016 and 2020. The Indian air force flies frontline Russian jets. Russia has supplied the Indian navy with frigates as well as India’s only active aircraft carrier and nuclear-powered attack submarine.

Many Indian foreign-policy elites also view what’s officially called the country’s “special and privileged strategic partnership” with Russia as a totem of Indian strategic autonomy. India shares Russia’s goal of a multipolar world. It is a member of the Russian- and Chinese-dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and of Brics, a loose grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. When President Vladimir Putin visited India in December, the Indian media made much of the fact that it was only his second foreign visit since the onset of the pandemic. (The first was Mr. Putin’s meeting with President Biden in Geneva in June.)

But Russian aggression against Ukraine will have broad geopolitical consequences that affect Indian national security. As the Brookings Institution’s Tanvi Madan points out in a recent op-ed, fresh Russian military action in Ukraine would undermine a key Indian strategic goal by virtually guaranteeing that Russia becomes even more dependent on China for political support, market access and technology. Indian neutrality won’t counter what will be a harsh international backlash, which will only give Beijing more sway over Moscow as its most important friend.

At the same time, Russian belligerence would force the U.S. to shift resources and attention away from the Indo-Pacific to Europe. Democrats don’t seem particularly eager to expand the American military budget, so a beefed-up presence in Eastern Europe means a thinner one elsewhere. And while not taking sides might seem neutral to Indians, Russia will frame it as a diplomatic victory and a sign of international support. In a tweet, Russia’s deputy ambassador to the U.N. already thanked India, along with China, Gabon and Kenya, for being “brave to withstand US hand-twisting before the vote.”

So far, the U.S. hasn’t made India choose between Washington and Moscow. India is a pivotal member of the Quad, which also includes the U.S. and its treaty allies Australia and Japan. Sens. Mark Warner and John Cornyn, among other U.S. lawmakers, have pressed for a waiver for India on so-called CAATSA sanctions, which would normally have been triggered by the delivery to India last year of a Russian S-400 missile defense system. The U.S. has imposed sanctions on Turkey for buying the same system, but India’s potential role as a bulwark against Chinese expansionism in Asia has made it likely to snag a waiver. That would almost certainly change if U.S.-Russia ties continue to deteriorate and India stays neutral.

Washington’s ardent wooing of New Delhi has led many Indian foreign-policy thinkers to conclude that the U.S. needs India more than India needs the U.S. This is a dangerous delusion. Having India on board would help the U.S. ensure that China doesn’t dominate Asia as a hegemon. But if relations with New Delhi cool, there is no immediate security risk to America. Unlike India, the U.S. doesn’t share a disputed boundary with China or face revanchist Chinese claims on its territory.

More broadly, American support for India since President George W. Bush has been based on the idea that it’s a rising democracy worth backing as it grows. India’s illiberal turn under Prime Minister Narendra Modi has already raised questions in Washington about the depth of shared values with New Delhi. In an essay last week for Asia Policy, Daniel Markey of the U.S. Institute for Peace argues that “U.S. policymakers should not assume U.S.-India convergence on liberal aims, including India’s commitment to the defense of the liberal international order.” Ambivalence about Russian aggression would further undermine the idea that a powerful India benefits the West.

India has a lot to lose if Russia ignites a new cold war in Europe. New Delhi can’t control Mr. Putin, but it could do more to make it clear to Moscow that it disapproves of Russian military adventurism. Of what use is a “special and privileged” partnership if you can’t speak the truth?