The age of hyper-terrorism and ‘low cost’ terrorism

On February 13, 2016, while speaking at the Munich Security Conference, French Prime Minister Manuel Valls reflected on the terrorist attacks in Paris over the previous year. “We have entered…a new era characterized by the lasting presence of ‘hyper-terrorism,’ he declared, adding, “There will be attacks. Large-scale attacks. It’s a certainty. This hyper-terrorism is here to stay. The force of the ideological fascination is formidable, and if we have changed eras, it is because this hyper-terrorism is in the heart of our societies.”

Valls’ declaration was hyperbolical: After all, terrorism is hardly a new problem. It existed throughout the Cold War and before and it has been a fact of life in failed states and conflict zones ever since. What is new is both the technology terrorists have at their disposal and the ease of transportation which terrorists enjoy. It was, however, refreshing to hear the French premier note the “force of ideological fascination” because too often political leaders and diplomats—especially in Europe and the United States—de-emphasize the ideological components of terrorism in favor of addressing grievances. While the question of what motivates terrorism—ideology or grievance—need not be an either-or answer, it is disingenuous to dismiss ideology. After all, religious terrorism in Egypt predated the partition of Palestine and there appears to be no correlation between poverty and lack of education and terrorism. Quite the contrary: It is often wealthier countries and better-educated segments of society which breed terrorists.

But was Valls correct that hyper-terrorism is here to stay? The reason France and Belgium have been hit so hard is not because terrorism is inevitable, but rather because their counterterrorism has been ineffective. Acquiescence is counterproductive. France and Belgium, other European countries, and the United States could enhance their counterterror strategies by learning from Morocco’s experience.

Morocco suffered numerous terror attacks over the decades, both from Marxist groups like the Polisario Front and more recently from Al Qaeda-inspired groups. In 2003 and 2007, terrorists struck in Casablanca, for example, and, in 2011, a terrorist bomb left in the Argana café here in Marrakech killed 17. In addition, several thousand Moroccans traveled to Syria or Iraq to join the Islamic State.

And yet, despite finding itself in one of the world’s most volatile regions, Morocco’s security improves even as the government preserves, and in many cases liberalizes, individual protections and respect for human rights, even if problems do remain Over the past 14 years, for example, Morocco has thwarted almost 350 attacks. Morocco succeeds with a holistic approach to counter-terrorism. With regard to religiously-motivated terrorism, the Moroccan government recognizes that they must engage Al Qaeda and the Islamic State in a battle of religious interpretation.. Here, the model provided by the Mourchidat program is important to emulate. Islam has a long, rich history and established theological record of interpretation. There is nothing un-Islamic or anti-religious about defending those who dedicate their life to the study of its theology against populists who might want to assume positions of leadership without having the humility or desire to learn. Morocco’s religious leadership helps countries like Mali, Tunisia, and even Egypt recover and shows that it is possible to counter, if not reverse, the radicalism promoted by countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iran, and now Turkey.

States that wish to counter terrorism successfully cannot shortchange hard power. Morocco’s security services do not handicap themselves unnecessarily with deference to political correctness when it comes to monitoring suspected radicals or radical organizations. . To monitor those proselytizing radicalism and those attracted to them is not Islamophobic; rather, it protects Muslims. After all, the chief victims of radical Islamism are moderate Muslims. The Islamic State has killed more Muslims than Christians, Yezidis, and Jews. Likewise, while newspapers cover ‘green-on-blue’ violence in Afghanistan, often left unreported is the fact that the rate of ‘green-on-green’ attacks are three-times as high.

Intelligence is crucial. Mass immigration and dislocation means that passports and nationalities no longer coincide with ideologies or value systems. European passport holders can be just as much a threat to security as those holding citizenship in conflict-zone countries. Germany, for example, became a destination of choice beginning in the 1950s for Islamists fleeing secular dictatorships in Egypt, Syria, and Turkey. As a result, many of the umbrella organizations in Europe were founded by the Muslim Brotherhood and Milli Görüs, both of which discouraged assimilation into Western liberal society. European intelligence services and their American corollaries must understand that there cannot be any site frequented by radicals that is immune to monitoring. Western intelligence services must also realize Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated advocacy groups use Western sensitivity to accusations of discrimination and racism to keep radical organizations open. Intelligence and monitoring will become even more important as those who fought for the Islamic State seek to return to their countries of origin with skills acquired on the battlefield.

Border security is also important. There is a direct correlation between nationalities fighting with the Islamic State and nationalities which receive visa waivers or visas on demand in Istanbul’s airport. Hence, several thousand Moroccans and Tunisians, and hundreds of Russians and Frenchmen migrated to the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, but only a few dozen Algerians even though history shows that Algerians are just as prone to radicalism. Had Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan been serious about countering the Islamic State and the Nusra Front (now known as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham), he would have insisted that anyone under the age of 40 years-old from nationalities contributing to the Islamic State apply for visas in advance.

Terrorism is a tactic. Countries sponsor it as part of their asymmetric warfare strategy and groups engage in it when its potential benefits outweigh its costs. But terrorism can also be risky. Every attack leaves behind forensic evidence which intelligence agencies can exploit. Holding terrorists accountable—killing them if need be—and ensuring their sponsors suffer economically and perhaps militarily for  proxy use raises the cost of terrorism and can temper its use. Good intelligence, meanwhile, can interdict those attacks which terrorists and their sponsors do plan. Confronting ideologies can de-legitimize them. Islamic history is full of such theological battles. The Khawarij challenged the Caliph Uthman and subsequently the Umayyads. Seljuq Muslims faced a terror campaign waged by the Nizari Ismailis. To simply suggest the inevitability of ideological fervor is malpractice.

Indeed, the chief problem in the fight against terrorism is not simply those that would murder in the name of religion, but rather the lack of seriousness with which European states are prepared to counter the challenge. Simply put, Europe has become the weak link. Recruitment for the Islamic State, for example, does not occur in the mosques of Meknes and Marrakech, but rather online from Molenbeek and Manchester. Too many Western officials still prefer to view terrorism as a criminal issue rather than a military matter and thus fear taking preventive action to shut down this channel of recruitment. Whereas many in Europe look at the Maghreb as posing a terror threat, the truth might be opposite: European refusal to curtail incitement and its moral equivalence with regard to ideology is increasingly endangering the Maghreb.

It is possible to counter hyper-terrorism. Indeed, it is nothing new. And, if terrorism is ‘low cost’ then the proper response is to raise the cost for those who would engage in it. European defeatism, however, has no place in the war against terror.