U.S. Policy Options in Iraq
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Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to testify before this distinguished committee today.
The subject of today’s hearing is important. The Senate’s decision will be more important. The United States has participated in three long wars on the European continent (two hot, one Cold). Obviously we have a major interest in this area.
Why Enlarge NATO?
The case for admitting Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to membership in NATO is not only strong, it is essentially the same as the case for organizing NATO in 1947–to provide a security shield behind which the free institutions of these more geographically vulnerable European democracies can strike deep roots and thrive, to deter aggression and to discourage conflict.
Of course there are differences between 1939, 1947 and 1997. There is no one major threat to peace and security throughout the region today. But if the threats of aggression, subversion and conquest are less clear now than they were after World Wars I and II, the new democracies’ appetite for democracy and peace is greater. And, more people now understand the benefits of freedom and long to share in them. They long for a place in the prosperity and security of the “West”. These nations associate that freedom, prosperity and security, with joining NATO (and the European Union) and they now ask for membership. It would be good for them and for NATO. Their membership will strengthen NATO by extending its reach, increasing the numbers of European troops available to defend the alliance and by enhancing defensive capabilities in central Europe.
The New Members Will “Fit” in NATO
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary share a history and a civilization with the countries of NATO. They were engaged in parallel patterns of democratic development when first, Adolf Hitler’s, then Joseph Stalin’s expansionist policies strangled their evolution. The people in each of these countries share our culture. They have repeatedly demonstrated their vocation for freedom with heroic efforts to throw off foreign domination and regain control of their own histories.
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary can be incorporated into NATO without creating serious disruption and without requiring a reorientation of NATO’s operations. They will “fit” in NATO. Their inclusion will not require qualitative changes in its purposes, culture, or mode of operation. NATO has been and, after their inclusion, will be a military alliance of democratic nations united in the determination to preserve their free societies from aggression–by force if necessary.
The Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary applied for membership in the European Union and in NATO years ago (Hungary applied for EC membership before Soviet forces had departed). They have met all stated requirements and have cooperated in all proposed projects including Partnership for Peace.
Their relevance to U.S. national security has been repeatedly recognized by American presidents. Four years have passed since President Clinton said in Prague, “Let me be absolutely clear: the security of your states is important to the security of the United States … the question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members but when and how.” And yet, still to this day, no country that suffered under Soviet dominance has yet been admitted to NATO or the EU.
“Threats” to a Democratic Eastern Europe
Procrastination has occurred even though the post Cold War period has seen the emergence of numerous threats to the development of a democratic central Europe. Resurgent anti-democrats have won power in some states and threaten peace in others. Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Slovakian Prime Minister Vladimir Mecias are examples.
Milosevic sponsored and encouraged Serbian aggression, and “ethnic cleansing” against Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (in that order). He has attempted to destabilize Macedonia, and he has repeatedly violated democratic norms and the human rights of the Serbian opposition. He has undermined democracy in Serbia and outside it. The violent attacks he sponsored devastated two states–Croatia and Bosnia and destabilized the region. These wars did happen. Yugoslavia’s separation could have been peaceful.
It is no accident, as the Marxists liked to remark, that in democratic Czechoslovakia the separation of Slovakia from Czech Republic was peaceful or, conversely, that the separation of Yugoslavia was violent. The difference can be found in the respect for democratic decisions. The Czech Republic is a democracy prepared to accept the democratic self-determination of Slovakia. Serbian rulers were not committed to democratic methods or self-government.
The result was a war that is still not settled.
There is, finally, only one reliable guarantee against aggression–it is not found in international agreements and organizations. It is found in the spread of democracy. A reliable peace is based on the simple fact that democracies do not invade one another, and do not engage in aggressive wars.
Numerous studies establish beyond reasonable doubt that the best system, the only reliable system of collective security is one in which all the governments in an area are democratic governments. Therefore, what reinforces democracy reinforces peace. That is the reason that the top priority for the United States and NATO should today be to preserve and strengthen the new democracies in Eastern and Central Europe and Russia as well. Preserving and strengthening democracies in Central and Eastern Europe should be the United States’ central goal and the top foreign policy priority in Europe. Membership in NATO helps achieve those goals and at the same time strengthens the alliance.
The Inadequacy of a Purely European Response
It is not graceful for an American to labor the inability of the EC or the WEU to protect peace and provide collective security to Europe. That failure is manifest, the more so because at the time Serbs took up arms against Slovenia and Croatia, then President of the EC, Mr. Poos of Luxembourg, said, “This is a European problem that will be solved by Europeans. There is no role for Americans.”
Everyone knows what happened. Presidents George Bush and Bill Clinton were more than willing to stand aside while first Europe, then the United Nations and Europe worked on the problem.
Unfortunately, this experience provided additional and timely evidence of the inadequacy of purely European security arrangements or of European arrangements plus the United Nations. UNPROFOR under the command of Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali provided the definitive evidence on the inability of the United Nations to mount an effective military operation.
The passive, inadequate response of the EU, the United Nations, the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Western European Union have testified to the ineffectiveness of a collective defense based only on these organizations. NATO has a different and a better record though it, too, was tarnished in Bosnia by its association with UNPROFOR.
The Inadequacy of a U.N. Response
Certain lessons of great relevance to European security leap out of the Yugoslav experience:
–that membership in the United Nations cannot be regarded as a reliable guarantor of European security;–that global institutions cannot necessarily provide solutions to regional problems;–that diplomacy may not be able to forestall aggression–whether or not that diplomacy is directed from the United Nations;–that “peacekeeping” is not an adequate response to the determined use of military force;–that the “peacekeeping” rules of engagement may turn “peacekeepers” into hostages without deterring the aggressors or assisting the victims; and,–that effective force is often necessary to repel force;–NATO can be that effective force.
Why Act Now?
No one knows how long the window of opportunity will remain open in this area where wars might develop. We do know, however, that misplaced timidity and indifference prevented timely action before World Wars I and II broke out. Mussolini could have been stopped in North Africa. Hitler might have been turned back at the Rhineland. A NATO could have stopped Joseph Stalin before the Czech coup. But NATO did not exist then. A distinguishing characteristic of human beings is said to be that we can learn from experience.
Czech President Vaclav Havel, a man of unusual foresight and courage, told the Economist magazine about a year ago that he fears the spirit of Munich has returned to Europe.
“I do not have in mind some concrete political act,” Havel said. “Rather I refer to a mentality marked by caution, hesitation, delayed decision-making and a tendency to look for the most convenient solutions.” Havel charged the governments of NATO and the European Union with “excessive caution” and worried aloud that the opportunity to build a Europe of independent democratic nations will not last forever.
As usual, Havel was right. Years which might have been used to integrate the new democracies and extend the institutions of freedom have already been lost through indifference, procrastination and timidity.
Can We Afford It?
The United States spends each year in former Yugoslavia several times our share of the cost of enlarging NATO.
How much more economical in money and lives it would have been to deter that conflict. We could save that money too, you may argue, by ignoring ethnic cleansing and massacres. But such thinking is inconsistent with our character. The United States cannot be indifferent to tragedy in the heart of the civilization of which we are part.
The American public understands our stake in a stable democratic Europe. A majority has supported our role in Europe through NATO–and supports its enlargement today.
What about Russia?
NATO is a defensive alliance dedicated to deterring and, if necessary, defeating aggression.
A democratic Russia will pose no threat to anyone. The most urgent problem in U.S. relations with Russia is to help Russian democrats defeat the internal enemies of Russia’s democracy. Our government is working hard on that problem.
Mr. Chairman, it should be remembered that President Yeltsin has repeatedly indicated that he has no problem with the inclusion in NATO of these independent European neighbors. We do not help Russian democrats by handing the opponents of democracy in Russia a victory over NATO, the longstanding symbol of the West’s commitment to defending democracy.
Thank you.
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick is a senior fellow at AEI.
