FROM: Shi'a SDE  
TO: Coalition Forces  

SUBJ: TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT  

Name of Detainee: Qayis Hadi Sa'id ((Al-Khazali))  
Report No: 200243-001  
Alias: None  
Shayikh: Unknown  
Category: 2A  
Captive Tag #: 1.4(a)  
Date of Capture: 20 0100 MAR 07  
Interrogator: 3.5(c)  
Date/Time: 111730 JUN 07  
Language Used: AD  
Interpreter: 3.5(c)  
Maps Used: None  
Significance: detainee is a suspected anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) group leader, and is associated with weapons smuggling from Iran, extra judicial killing (EJK) activity, and involvement with the attack on the Karbala PJCC.  

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Summary:  

- Introductory Sessions to establish rapport and discuss focus of future sessions.  

The session was spent informing Detainee that a plan needed to be created on how he would accomplish changing leaders’ views of CF. There also needs to be a change in relations between Sunni and Shi’a as well. Detainee understands that he needs to assist with creating a plan to implement these changes and future sessions will focus of identifying the problems creating the current situation along with what solutions are needed to resolve them.
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Reason: 1.5 (a)
Declassify On: 25X1
Shi’a SDE
Tactical Interrogation Report

FROM: Shi’a SDE  
TO: Coalition Forces

SUBJ: TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT

Name of Detainee: Qayis Hadi Sa'id ((Al-Khazali))
Report No: 200243-002
Alias: None
Shayikh: Unknown
Category: 2A
Captive Tag #: 1.4(a)
Date of Capture: 20 0100 MAR 07
Interrogator: 3.5 c
Date/Time: 121730 JUN 07
Language Used: AD
Interpreter: 3.5(c)
Maps Used: None

Significance: detainee is a suspected anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) group leader, and is associated with weapons smuggling from Iran, extra judicial killing (EJK) activity, and involvement with the attack on the Karbala PJCC.

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Summary:
- This session was used to assign Detainee questions to address while in his cell.

Detainee was given three questions to address the perception of CF and the current situation in Iraq. Detainee was given the following questions:

What is the current perception of Coalition Forces in the Shi’a Community?
What issues / actions draw negative attention to Coalition Forces in the Shi’a Community?
What are the ideal conditions for a productive relationship between Coalition Forces and the Shi’a Community?

Detainee's answers will be reviewed in the next interrogation before redirecting his focus.
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Shi’a SDE
Tactical Interrogation Report

FROM: Shi’a SDE
TO: Coalition Forces

SUBJ: TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT

Name of Detainee: Qayis Hadi Sa’id ((Al-Khazali))
Report No: 200243-003
Alias: None
Shayikh: Unknown
Category: 2A
Captive Tag #: 1.4(a)
Date of Capture: 20 0100 MAR 07
Interrogator: 3.5(c)
Date/Time: 141730 JUN 07
Language Used: AD
Interpreter: 3.5(c)
Maps Used: None
Significance: detainee is a suspected anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) group leader, and is associated with weapons smuggling from Iran, extra judicial killing (EJK) activity, and involvement with the attack on the Karbala PJCC.

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Summary:

- Detainee provided his response on the Shi’a community perception of CF.
- Detainee was given new questions to address while in his cell.

The Shi’a community generally now sees CF as occupiers. This view is a result of CF using force to solve problems like the battle in An Najaf. This use of force caused many people to seek a military resolution to CF presence. The political leaders of course want a political resolution while the military leaders seek military resolution respectively.

The mistakes CF have made on personal and political levels have also contributed to the negative perception of CF. Abu Ghurayb was a personal
mistake made by individual people which gave the media an opportunity to speak negatively about CF.

Because CF refuse to set a time for withdrawal, the Shi’a community understands this to mean that CF want to remain here indefinitely. This once again reinforces the title ((Occupiers)). If CF set a time to withdrawal and said that it would only stay in Iraq if the Iraqi government requested it, then that would eliminate one facet of the occupying force persona.

Shi’a ideology and the Shi’a community are not hateful. Offensive Jihad is forbidden, which is why you do not see Shi’a conducting attacks or bombings like what occurred with the twin towers in New York or the bombing in London. Defensive Jihad is the only allowable Jihad by Shiri’a law; this means the defense of the homeland from occupying forces.

The first thing that needs to be established in Iraq is security, followed by political stability and economic development. Bringing back the electricity, medical facilities, and industrial plants that were present under Saddam would be a good start. This would assist in bringing foreign businesses to Iraq for investment. Iraq could become the premier country for industry and technology in the Middle East just like Germany in Europe and Japan in the East.  

Detainee was given three questions to address regarding sectarian violence. Detainee was given the following questions:

What is the cause of sectarian violence in Iraq?
How are the foreigners (Wahabi Arabs) affecting the sectarian violence in Iraq?
What affect (good or bad) the religious leaders (Sunni and Shi’a) have had on sectarian violence? (Discuss what effect the situation between Ayatollah Ha’iri and Muqtada Al-Sadr has had on sectarian violence)

Detainee will be given a couple of days to write his answers before doing a review and redirecting his focus once again.
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Shi’a SDE
Tactical Interrogation Report

FROM: Shi’a SDE
TO: Coalition Forces

SUBJ: TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT

Name of Detainee: Qayis Hadi Sa’id ((Al-Khazali))
Report No: 200243-004
Alias: None
Shayikh: Unknown
Category: 2A
Captive Tag #: 1.4(a)
Date of Capture: 20 0100 MAR 07
Interrogator: 3.5(c)
Date/Time: 151730 JUN 07
Language Used: AD
Interpreter: 3.5(c)
Maps Used: None
Significance: Detainee is a suspected anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) group leader, and is associated with weapons smuggling from Iran, extra judicial killing (EJK) activity, and involvement with the attack on the Karbala PJCC.

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Summary:
- Detainee provided his response on the origins of sectarian violence in Iraq.
- Detainee did not recognize photos presented.

Detainee provided his answers regarding the origin of sectarian violence in Iraq. The remainder of the sessions was spent explaining what was going to happen over the next few days and preparing Detainee for a discussion on Muqtada Al-Sadr.

More information will be available with the translation of Detainee’s answers.

Detainee’s brother, Fa’ik Hadi Sayid Hassan ((Al-Khazali)) was kidnapped from the Abu Ghurayb area near Al-Khandhari on June 5, 2006. He was kidnapped with his friend ‘Amir Muhaybas Badi’awi ((Al-Dilfi)).
Detainee did not recognize any of the following pictures:

Unknown

Behrouz Motavaselian

Unknown

Mohammad Reza Ahadi

Unknown

Javad Alizadeh
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Shi’a SDE
Tactical Interrogation Report

FROM: Shi’a SDE
TO: Coalition Forces

SUBJ: TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT

Name of Detainee: Qayis Hadi Sa’id ((Al-Khazali))
Report No: 200243-005
Alias: None
Shayikh: Unknown
Category: 2A
Captive Tag #: 1.4(a)
Date of Capture: 20 0100 MAR 07
Interrogator: 3.5(c)
Date/Time: 161730 JUN 07
Language Used: AD
Interpreter: 3.5(c)
Maps Used: None
Significance: detainee is a suspected anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) group leader, and is associated with weapons smuggling from Iran, extra judicial killing (EJK) activity, and involvement with the attack on the Karbala PJCC.

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Summary:
- Explained the Reconciliation program to Detainee
- Discussed methods to teach Shi’a in prison about right path in Islam.
- Discussed Shi’a leaders already in custody that would be suitable to consult with for a religious council inside prison.
- Briefly discussed the return of Muqtada Al-Sadr and his intentions in Iraq.

This was a combined session with Detainee and his brother Layth. The Reconciliation program was explained to Detainee with emphasis on the rehabilitation of prisoners as his current focus followed by re-integration into society as a religious leader influencing political parties for the betterment of the Iraqi Government. Detainee was concerned with the social level of the prisoners he would be speaking with inside the prison so he does not lose face for talking to someone below his level. This may also be resolved by placing Detainee into
the general population so he is seen as being forced into the social condition. Ultimately the best solution reached was to have Detainee meet with a select group of leaders from the Shi’a compounds and provide lessons on Islam for the leaders to take back and pass on to the general population. This would provide a platform to distribute the lessons created during future sessions.

Detainee provided the following names of individuals in custody who would be high enough for Detainee to speak with:

Hadi Al-Darraji
Sayyid ‘Adnan Al-‘Unaybi
‘Ali Al-Nu’amani
‘Adnan Al-Dulaymi
Hassan Salim

Detainee agrees that relations between the Shi’a community and CF need to improve and is willing to gradually assist with this. Detainee also believes that Muqtada Al-Sadr (MAS) will try and change the government to suite his desires or he will try and bring the government down through civil disobedience. MAS probably came back into Iraq on the advice of Iran. Before MAS came back into Iraq he probably tried to contact one of three people to setup a secret meeting with Special Group leaders in order to gain favor with Special Groups: Ahmad AL-Shaybani, Jabar Khafaji or Muhammad Al-Sa’adi. He will express his support and love for Special Groups while claiming his support for the resistance. He will then divide his goals into political agendas and military agendas. This will be followed by keeping Special Groups at a distance so he is not involved in their activities but has their loyalty.
Classified By: Unit SCG
Reason: 1.5 (a)
Declassify On: 25X1
Shi’a SDE
Tactical Interrogation Report

FROM: Shi’a SDE
TO: Coalition Forces

SUBJ: TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT

Name of Detainee: Qayis Hadi Sa’id ((Al-Khazali))
Report No: 200243-006
Alias: None
Shayikh: Unknown
Category: 2A
Captive Tag #: 1.4(a)
Date of Capture: 20 0100 MAR 07
Interrogator: 3.5(c)
Date/Time: 171730 JUN 07
Language Used: AD
Interpreter: 3.5(c)
Maps Used: None

Significance: detainee is a suspected anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) group leader, and is associated with weapons smuggling from Iran, extra judicial killing (EJK) activity, and involvement with the attack on the Karbala PJCC.

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Summary:

- Detainee did not recognize any of the pictures presented.

Detainee did not recognize any of the following pictures:
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Shi’a SDE
Tactical Interrogation Report

FROM: Shi’a SDE
TO: Coalition Forces

SUBJ: TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT

Name of Detainee: Qayis Hadi Sa’id ((Al-Khazali))
Report No: 200243-007
Alias: None
Shayikh: Unknown
Category: 2A
Captive Tag #: 1.4(a)
Date of Capture: 20 0100 MAR 07
Interrogator: 3.5(c)
Date/Time: 181730 JUN 07
Language Used: AD
Interpreter: 3.5(c)
Maps Used: None

Significance: detainee is a suspected anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) group leader, and is associated with weapons smuggling from Iran, extra judicial killing (EJK) activity, and involvement with the attack on the Karbala PJCC.

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Summary:

- Translation of Detainee’s writings on Shiite view of CF.

((Translation is below))

The Shiite populations in general, like all Iraqis, view the Coalition Forces as an occupier with no distinction in this regard from clergy, military or politicians; but some of them say this openly while others do not. Yet all are certain that the resolution could be achieved politically to end the occupation without need for other methods. Yet some military leaders and clergy students believe that armed resistance is the right path to end this occupation and that all the political approaches are powerless to stop the economical and political greed of the Coalition Forces. Of course this view did not exist at the beginning of the collapse of the old regime. All Shiites were joyful when these forces entered this country with the intention to save us from the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein.
But things changed gradually, bit by bit, because of the bad management of the previous government (Paul Bremer) who listened to the advice of some politicians who considered their own interests far away from the interests of the (Iraqi) people or that of the American people. In any event, the first confrontation that took place between the Americans and the Shiites was with the Al-Sadr movement. The words of advice to the Americans were that those people (Al-Sadr movement) are trouble makers, they are weak, and we should shift the country from their atrocities. Based on this assumption, the Americans acted vigorously by closing Al-Hawza newspaper and arresting Sayyid al-Yagubi and got involved in two fights: the first and second battles of an-Najaf. When that battle took place in An Najaf, An-Najaf was a very respected place in the Shiite community and was considered one of the holiest shrines on earth. The overuse of the military power and rejecting all political solutions have led to the belief from the Shiite community that CF are occupying forces. This is especially the view by Al-Sadr Movement. Of course judging certain conditions or certain forces in order to look at them as occupying forces is not based on how those forces behave or what kind of mechanism they use with the events. The question is not what kind of language we use. It is just very important to know that Iraqi society and the Iraqi people are religious people and they are loyal to their clergy. They are not much in favor of any parties on the field because that is not their interest.

We can divide all Shiites in Iraq into two categories: The Al-Sadr group which follows Al-Sadr and the second group that follows Al-Sistani. The Sistani followers are very firm, clear, and practical. They are also clear as to what direction they are heading. But the followers of Al-Sadr are somewhat confused, unstable both religiously and politically. The reason is they do not have the proper religious leadership so they are divided between Al-Sadr and Sayyid al-Ha’iri and Shaykh al-Yagubi. The core of the problem is with those whom follow MAS because he himself is not stable, but he is constantly changing his mind and that reflects on his followers. One day he will tell you that the American forces or CF are an occupying force and he will tell you that we should resist by political means. Then he will draw back from that conclusion and tell you that we must resist by military means. This mind changing creates too much waste, obstacles, and hardships because you do not understand his right clear thinking in order to dialogue or converse with him. We believe that this problem is much greater than if he had a negative assumption or understanding of things.

The most important subjects that could be viewed negatively against CF are the same subjects and mistakes that were previously adopted. In general, the problem is the adaptation of military means to reach a political achievements and rejecting a political choice in order to put an end to current problems. It is fair to say that some of those mistakes were individually conducted and they were not a political agenda adopted by which panic suggests. The Abu Ghurayb issue and the subject of raids that go in Mahmudiya were what the media has concentrated on heavily and made it a great issue in the minds of the citizens of Iraq. I believe that the punishment against the American soldiers in the Mahmudiya case was fair, but in the case of Abu Ghurayb prison, it was not enough and was not convincing in the view of an Iraqi citizen. That created feelings that the Americans are looking out for their own interests even if their soldiers are the aggressor and the Iraqi citizen has no value or importance. The
case of Abu Ghurayb was not solved in a proper manner and this individual conduct by some American soldiers stained the whole American Army.

If we go back to the question of why we insist on scheduling a withdrawal or pullout (of troops) is not the right one. The question should be addressed in this kind of way, “Why not insist on the withdrawal of these forces?” In reality, the insistence not to put a schedule to withdraw confirms that American forces have no intention to pull out and in their minds, that they want to stay a very long time, maybe forever, and this means they are occupying forces. Some think that the difference between the scheduling and not scheduling actually is very simple and only playing with words and is not practical. For example, the American government will state that they want to stay unless the Iraqi government requests our departure. Or they will say that we wish to pull our forces unless the Iraqi government wants us to stay. The answer is the same but the meaning is different. So we go back to the question again, why not insist on scheduling the withdrawal? For example the answer will be that we anticipate staying one more year unless the Iraqi government wants us to stay and then the Iraqi government will request that stay longer if they see it as necessary.

In regards to permitting the Shiites to be permitted to fight a self defense fight through the Sha’ria law, I have to make one thing clear before I deal with this issue. Shiites are not aggressive, nor are they extreme against the Americans or any others; the reason for this is the Sha’ria law. The Sha’ria law that was adopted by the Shi’a refers to the al Jihad in two different ways. First is the offensive Jihad and the second is the defensive Jihad. Offensive Jihad means that you start an offensive on the other side and this is viewed by all Shiite clergy as not being in their magisterial area and there is only one available Imam to make that decision. And because this available Imam does not exist, no one can make that decision. Therefore, no Shi’a went to the Trade center in New York to blow it up nor were there any in the metro transportation system in London or anywhere else. But the defensive Jihad in their view is permitted. The defensive Jihad means that you defend yourself when you are exposed to danger in exactly the conditions we are in now. If you are living in your country and some foreign forces came and attacked you and occupied your country, then you have a right to fight back and defend yourself. Of course this situation is deferred if you know that the forces do not want to stay, change their offensive nature, and it wants to pullout in peace without hurting the other side. At this point we could say you could reach a treaty based on this assumption. As it is said in the Koran, if they seek peace, then seek it, and if the other side truly wants peace then you have to agree even if this is actually not clearly visible from the other side. As I previously stated, the Shiite community does not have ideology toward the American society or any other society in the world; but they view them all as the same. We should deal with them positively, cooperatively for the greater good. But the Shiite ideology is aggressive toward the occupier. So first you should convince the Shiite population that American forces are not an occupying force and this is very hard. Or convince them that American forces do not want to
continue the occupation and need to withdraw as soon as possible, but there are some obstacles with this regard. One of the obstacles is an unstable Iraq in terms of the security and political instability. The American government should be willing to help Iraq in many areas and should think of how this country could prosper. My personal belief toward that goal is to correct the previous mistakes of the past. For example, there are many civilians who have been killed because of the military operations, and no one has been reimbursed for this damage. Also, there are too many prisoners who have not been released. Conversely, the arresting method is still continually active. The problem with the security situation is the core of the problem. With this situation you cannot build an economy or establish any gain. If we assume that the security situation will be improved or established, then the political situation will be established. Because we believe the current political situation is no good to control the country and solve its problems, we assume there must be some changes in the political arena. I have stated some observations and changes and have conveyed some thoughts to Miss Tina in previous statements. You could go back to my previous statements.

What is left in the end is the economic situation which is the easiest part of the subject because of the many thoughts and projects that we could provide. It is also easy because the Iraqi lands have a lot of resources, skills, and treasures which makes it possible to make Iraq like Germany and Europe. Afterwards, Iraq will become an idol or something, to follow economically or otherwise in the Middle East. Economically, we should repair all the factories that used to exist before the collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime; and there are so many like the food factory, medicine factory, electric supplies and construction material. Then we build new projects that could be beneficial to ease people's lives. I know there are a lot of foreign investors who wish to invest inside of Iraq and there are so many projects and thoughts that are ready to be established here. As I said, what is preventing them from doing so is the security situation.

((End of Translation))

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Shi’a SDE
Tactical Interrogation Report

FROM: Shi’a SDE
TO: Coalition Forces

SUBJ: TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT

Name of Detainee: Qayis Hadi Sa’id (Al-Khazali)
Report No: 200243-008
Alias: None
Shayikh: Unknown
Category: 2A
Captive Tag #: 1.4(a)
Date of Capture: 20 0100 MAR 07
Interrogator: 3.5(c)
Date/Time: 181730 JUN 07
Language Used: AD
Interpreter: 3.5(c)
Maps Used: None

Significance: Detainee is a suspected anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) group leader, and is associated with weapons smuggling from Iran, extra judicial killing (EJK) activity, and involvement with the attack on the Karbala PJCC.

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Summary:

- Detainee talked about Iranian relations with JAM Special Groups

Training for Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) Special Groups is conducted inside of Iran at the IRGC bases. Detainee knows there are three bases near Tehran for this training but has only been to one, the Imam Khomeini base. This base is about two to two and a half hours outside of Tehran; Detainee does not know which compass direction for sure but suspects either east or west as he was not heading toward Qom, Iran or the sea. There are Iranians and Lebanese Hezbollah conducting the training at these bases. The Iranians are experts in full scale warfare while the Lebanese are experts in urban or guerilla warfare.

JAM receives assistance from Iran in the form of training, weapons, and funding. The money comes through Hawalas and Sayyid Mustafah Al-Yagubi was
previously responsible for getting the money. Al-Yagubi is now in Iran and sends the money to either Shayikh Jabar AL-Khafaji or Shayikh Muhammad AL-Sa’adi in the JAM Logistics Committee for Managing the Army office. This committee was put together about a year ago by MAS and Detainee oversaw this committee for a period of time. The money received by the committee is distributed as follows: Special Groups, Regular JAM, Social Services and Veteran Services for families of Martyrs. The average amount sent is two million USD per months.

Although Iran provides support they do not dictate the targets for Special Groups. Iran does provide suggestions for Special Group target selections but does not get specific. For example, Iran suggested focusing attention on Basrah and attacking British forces to force a withdrawal of British troops. This would place American forces in a critical situation and increase the likelihood of a withdrawal by Americans.

Abu Mustafah Al-Shaybani is not a Sadrist and Detainee does not know if he has any connections to the Hezbollah. Shaybani is considered Badr.

Detainee knows that Iran has a desire to open a dialogue with Sunnis because they have a strong desire to retake control of the Iraqi government. Iran wants a strong influence in Iraq for both the short and long term. Iran knows that Sunnis will always have a negative attitude towards Iranians and stand opposed to them. Iran wants to workout a relationship for the future with Sunnis to fight Americans militarily and politically in Iraq. Iran’s main goal is to have Salafi, Wahabi, Sunni, and Shi’a to combine forces and fight the occupying forces of Iraq. Iran knows the Shi’a are not sufficient alone so they have created a relationship with the Kurdish and needs a relationship with the Sunni as well. Detainee believes that Iran would like to make Iraq a colony of Iran.

Shi’a in Iraq fighting CE are either Sadists or Badrists. The Sadists are not loyal to Iran but the Badrists are totally loyal to Iran. For example, at one point in time there were problems with Iraq and one of the Sadists said that if these problems persist then they should all go and blow up the Iranian Embassy. When Badr and Sadr fought over the burning of the Sadr office in An-Najaf and over three hundred Badr offices all over Southern Iraq, Sadr complained to Iran about being attacked with Iranian weapons. Sadr responded by saying all they had was Iranian weapons. Iran had a strong reaction to this incident and called for Muqtada al-Sadr to Iran to speak with him about this issue. MAS sent Detainee in his place. Iran expressed their concern for the mistake and said they did not want a repeat of this incident and asked for an improvement in relations between Sadr and Badr personnel and leadership. As a result, a few days during Ramadan, Sadr invited Badr to break the fast with them in Al-Khadihimiyah. Later, Badr invited Sadr to Al-Jadhririyah to break the fast with them. Detainee stated, “When we walked up to the Badr headquarters one of the Sadr guys asked why we don’t just occupy this place, it is really nice and the security is too heavy?”
Special Groups does not receive any technical training on producing weapons or explosives. They can copy the small explosives but the problem is they cannot copy the remotes. Without the remotes they have to use wires and that is no good in an urban environment. Wires are fine in the countryside but remote detonation in needed for the city areas. Plus, C-4 is not readily available in Iraq so it is more practical to simply buy the completed bombs with remotes. Special Groups has requested training on remotes but was denied. The remotes are available only from Iran.

The most respected Shi’a leaders ranked from highest to lowest are as follows:

1) Sistani
2) Kathim Al-Ha’iri
3) Muhammad Sayyid Al-Hakim
4) Muhammad As-Haq AL-Fayadh
5) Bashir Al-Pakistani aka Bashir Al-Najafi

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Classified By: Unit SCG
Reason: 1.5 (a)
Declassify On: 25X1
FROM: Shi’a SDE  
TO: Coalition Forces  
SUBJ: TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT

Name of Detainee: Qayis Hadi Sa’id ((Al-Khazali))  
Report No: 200243-009  
Alias: None  
Shaykh: Unknown  
Category: 2A  
Capture Tag #: 1.4(a)  
Date of Capture: 20 0100 MAR 07  
Interrogator: [5A]  
Date/Time: 211530 JUN 07  
Language Used: AD  
Interpreter: [5A]  
Maps Used: None  

Significance: detainee is a suspected anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) group leader and is associated with weapons smuggling from Iran, extra judicial killing (EJK) activity, and involvement with the attack on the Karbala PJCC.

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Summary:
- Detainee discussed his history with MAS.
- Detainee provided his opinion on the direction MAS has taken in the past.

Detainee first came to know Muqtada al-Sadr (MAS) in the Hawza School in 1995. Detainee and MAS were on the Rights Through Shari’ah Law Committee together. They continued their friendship after Muhammad al-Sadi’s death during Saddam’s Regime. Many Sadists fled Iraq but Detainee and MAS stayed. MAS accepted and adhered to much of Detainee’s advice which made their relationship grow even more.

After Muhammad Al-Sadi’s death, the rightful successor was Ayatollah Ha’ari. Ha’ari appointed MAS as his overall official representative which gave MAS a lot of popularity. Sayyid Nur al-Din Ashhuri took MAS’s place as the official representative and advised Ha’ari to keep the Sadr offices open and operate them under the control of the Ha’ari offices. Ashhuri opened the offices of Sayyid Al Ha’ari and Ha’ari took control of the offices of the Martyred Sadr. According to Shari’ah Law, once the successor takes over the offices are to be changed to follow the successor’s name and remain under the control of the successor. Ashhuri’s advice was an attempt to maintain the popularity and power of the Martyred Sadr amongst the people while still maintaining Ha’ari’s power. The offices of the Martyred Sadr took up civil services all over Iraq with the exception of Kurdistan and the Sunni Triangle. These services included protecting government institutions, cleaning the areas up, taking care of traffic and general civil duties. This made the Office of the Martyred Sadr very popular with the people.

Ashhuri is Iranian but conducted his studies in An Najaf. Ashhuri is a close friend of Ha’ari and is qualified to be an Ayatollah but has not declared it.
When the two battles in An Najaf occurred, Ha’ari was not in Iraq, and MAS took the opportunity to publicly promote his support for resistance. With his previous position as an official representative of the Office of the Martyred Sadr, his family name, and his siding with the popular opinion at the time placed MAS in a position to challenge Ha’ari and take control of the Offices of the Martyred Sadr.

MAS calls the office he controls the Office of the Martyred Sadr while many people call it the Office of Muqtada al-Sadr. MAS uses the name which refers back to his father in order to give respect and to maintain the family lineage for the public. Rightfully, these offices should not be under his control according to his father’s decree of the successor and thereby under Shari’ah Law.

Muqtada al-Sadr’s opposition to the government is what maintains his popularity. He cannot compete with current government officials like Hakim, Ja’afari, Maliki, etc. because they have far greater knowledge of politics and influence in the government. When MAS joined the government he lost popularity and power with the people. He withdrew from the government, taking his ministers and leaving only his people in Parliament in order to move back to an opposing position where he could regain his popularity and power with the people. This move to withdraw from the government was the result of advice from Sayyid Hassan Nasrullah in Lebanon. Nasrullah did the same thing with his government in Lebanon which produced favorable results for him. MAS idolizes Nasrullah and aspires to reach his level as a leader in Iraq.

Sayyid Hassan Nasrullah will intervene in issues with MAS when asked to do so by Iran. MAS is trying to reach Nasrullah’s level of influence in every aspect. Detainee strongly suspects that MAS had to visit Ghassam Sulaymani from IRGC Quds force while he was in Iran. Nasrullah has a strong relationship with Sulaymani and MAS needs a strong relationship in order to achieve the same results with Iran. Sulaymani has already declared his goal to “Liberate Iraq from the Occupying Forces.” Sulaymani is providing training, weapons and funding to accomplish this goal.

MAS may have also gone to Iran in order to reach new agreements for more political and financial support. Iran has a lot of influence with political parties in Iraq. If Iran extends their support to MAS, then these political parties under Iranian influence will lend support as well. MAS does not want to cut ties with Iran by any measure. He wants Iran and needs Iran just as much as Iran needs him. MAS benefits from both the Sunnis and CF by saying he wants to cut ties, but just before he gains everything he wants, he will go back on his word concerning Iran.

Harath Al-Dhari has already extended his wishes to create a truce with Sadr in order to thwart Iranian influence in Iraq. United Arab Emirates previously invited MAS to bolster the Sunni relations in Iraq, but MAS declined the invitation. The Gulf States want MAS to support the Sunni cause to preserve Sunni rights within the government and in the general Iraqi population. Al-Dhari pledged to gain financial support for MAS that would match Iran’s funding in exchange for MAS cutting Iranian ties. MAS is trying to balance his position with both sides in order to gain from both Iran and Al-Dhari.

MAS is looking to create his own government to suite his own needs. He needs to gain Sunni support and CF support in order to remove Prime Minister Maliki from the current government. The Sunni do not like Maliki and Sadr does not care for him either due to recent positions Maliki has taken against Sadr.

Once MAS gets everything he wants established he will leave the country once again. The first time he left was not proper because he fled for fear of being captured by CF. This was probably from the advice of Sayyid Mustafah al-Yaqubi who is also scared of being captured by CF. This time when MAS leaves, he must do it right which means he will need an invitation from another country to visit. Syria or Turkey is a potential to extend this invitation. Once out of the country, MAS will end up in Iran and claim he needs to stay in Iran to complete his degree. At that point MAS will not return to Iraq.
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Before Detainee was captured he formed a committee of old Sadr members, from Muhammad Sadr’s time, who are disenchanted with MAS. The common goal among them is to end the dictatorship of MAS and re-establish the right things in the Office of the Martyred Sadr. The committee needs the backing of Ayatollah Ha’ari in order to power under the Shari’a Law.

Detainee was given the following questions to write about over the next couple of days:

1. How would Muqtada al-Sadr hold the Shi’i group to a ceasefire?
2. How would the Iranians insert their influence to maintain instability during a ceasefire?
3. How would Muqtada a-Sadr unify all Shi’a groups under one umbrella in order to drive out CF?

Detainee’s family has gone to Iran. Their exact location in Iran is unknown but it is most likely Qum, Iran.

OVERALL CLASSIFICATION OF TIRS IS

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Reason: 1.5 (a)
Declassify On: 25X1
Declassified by: MG Terry Ferrell
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 23 February 2018

SECRET//ORCON//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Shi'a SDE
Tactical Interrogation Report

FROM: Shi'a SDE
TO: Coalition Forces

SUBJ: TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT

Name of Detainee: Qayis Hadi Sa'id ((Al-Khazali))
Report No: 200243-010
Alias: None
Shayikh: Unknown
Category: 2A
Captive Tag #: 1.4(a)
Date of Capture: 20 0100 MAR 07
Interrogator: 3.5(c)
Date/Time: 23 2200 JUN 07
Language Used: AD
Interpreter: 3.5(c)
Maps Used: None
Significance: Detainee is a suspected anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) group leader, and is
associated with weapons smuggling from Iran, extra judicial killing (EJK) activity,
and involvement with the attack on the Karbala PJCC.

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SECRET//ORCON//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

Summary:

- Detainee discussed plan to preach against Muqtada Al-Sadr in prison

This session was used to clarify the Reconciliation program for Detainee and
clarify the desired results from him and his brother Layth 1.4(a)
Detainee agreed with the following goals for his participation:

1) Take power from MAS and reduce his position in Iraq.
2) Bring Ayatollah Ha'ari back to the public eye and in opposition to MAS.
3) Rally support of public for Ayatollah Ha'ari to restore his position in
   accordance with Shari'a Law.
4) Improve relations between the Shi'a community and CF.
5) Improve relations between the Shi'a community and GOI.
Detainee sees three main problems effecting peace in Iraq. The view of foreign forces as occupying forces, people seeking power by whatever means necessary, and gangs killing and kidnapping people. The easiest problem to solve is the gangs; they should be captured and punished according to Iraqi law. They are criminals that operate similar to the mafia. The next easiest problem to solve is with the view of occupying forces. Convincing the people that CF are not an occupying force will be difficult, but can be accomplished in two ways:

1) Convince the people CF are not occupiers and want to leave Iraq. Before CF can leave certain goals need to be accomplished and withdrawal will occur. Stop performing operations as the primary aggressor. Operations should be conducted by Iraqi forces with CF in support. CF should also stop patrolling the streets inside of cities because that draws the attacking forces into the city and innocent civilians are killed as a result.

2) Create a treaty with the Iraqi people through an intermediary like Ibrahim Ja’afari or Salam Al-Maliki. The treaty would reassure the people of Iraq that CF will withdraw in a timely manner. The time frame is not the most important thing with this. The treaty must utilize the political intermediary to convince the people of CF’s promise to withdraw and give his own promise to the people that it will occur. The intermediary can negotiate a ceasefire with opposition while the desired goals of CF are accomplished leading up to their withdrawal. In exchange, CF might release the prisoners with no blood on their hands as a sign of good faith. In addition, CF should compensate the civilians who lost family members and property as a result of this war.

For Detainee’s contribution while in prison, he can lead a committee inside the prison to teach the prisoners against MAS. Detainee can meet with select Shi’a religious leaders and military leaders to communicate CF’s intentions to withdraw and MAS’ intentions to gain power for selfish reasons. This will help change the view of CF as an occupying force and help with Detainee’s idea on how to bring Ayatollah Ha’ari back into power of the Office of the Martyred Sadr.

Ayatollah Ha’ari cannot accomplish ousting MAS on his own. MAS has grown too powerful with the people in not only the political arena but the religious and social arenas as well. Detainee suggests bringing Ibrahim Ja’afari back to the political spotlight to oppose MAS in the political arena. Muhammad Ta’ttab’i would provide sufficient social opposition to MAS in order to take some of power there. Of course Ayatollah Ha’ari is a respected religious person who can use Shari’a Law to regain his position and power within OMS. With the support of CF and GOI these people could reduce Sadr’s power and popularity in Iraq drastically.

Detainee would like to form a committee inside of the prison that would provide other prisoners guidance against MAS. This guidance would be based on the religious prestige Detainee and the others on the committee hold. Additionally, Detainee would like a military representative that he knows began speaking
against MAS before his arrest. The prisoners he would like on the committee are
Hassan Salim (military influence in Sadr City), Hadi Al-Darraji (religious / political
influence in Sadr City), ‘Ali Nu’mani (religious influence in Wasit), Sayyid ‘Adnan
Al-Dulaymi (religious / military influence in Hilah), and Hakim Al-Zamili (former
Deputy Health Minister – political influence).

1.4(c)

1.4(c)

1.4(c)

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Classified By: Unit SCG
Reason: 1.5 (a)
Declassify On: 25X1
FROM: Shi'a SDE  
TO: Coalition Forces  

SUBJ: TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT  

Name of Detainee: Qayis Hadi Sa'id ((Al-Khazali))  
Report No: 200243-011  
Alias: None  
Shayikh: Unknown  
Category: 2A  
Captive Tag #: 1.4(a)  
Date of Capture: 20 0100 MAR 07  
Interrogator: 3.5(c)  
Date/Time: 25 2200 JUN 07  
Language Used: AD  
Interpreter: 3.5(c)  
Maps Used: None  
Significance: Detainee is a suspected anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) group leader, and is associated with weapons smuggling from Iran, extra judicial killing (EJK) activity, and involvement with the attack on the Karbala PJCC.  

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Summary:  

- Detainee discussed plan to preach against Muqtada Al-Sadr in prison  

Some of the Sadrist families fled from Iraq to Qum and have not returned. Two influential individuals that were students of Muhammad Sadr are Sayid Khamal Al-Haydari and Ayatollah Fadil Al-Mallaki. They are scholars from the Hawza School in different sections that both oppose Iranian influence in Iraq. Al-Haydari has been on TV and has produced CD’s for the Shi’a community.  

MAS receiving support from CF is understandable because it is in reaction to CF occupying Iraq. MAS visiting Iran for a few days to a week is understandable but longer periods of time are not acceptable. Muhammad Baqir Sadr was clearly opposed to Iranian influence in Iraq and stated that publicly. To have MAS spend so long in Iran was a mistake and a damaging act to his reputation. When
CF announced that MAS had gone to Iran the Sadrists did not believe them. When Muhammad Tabtaba’i announced the same information in a council format it was taken as real. Announcing Sadr’s strong ties to Iran, in conflict with his father’s desires, must be announced by a Sadrist in order to be received well.

Detainee suggested using a video of Muhammad Baqir Sadr’s speech that stated the person who leads the Shi’a people in Iraq must be an Ayatollah, at that point show a picture of Ayatollah Ha’ari. He continued that the religious leader of Iraq cannot be anything less than an Ayatollah because it will lead to destruction; this is where a picture of MAS can be shown with pictures of his resulting destruction in Iraq.

Detainee also suggested reopening the Hawza newspaper with the previous editor, Shayikh ‘Abbas Al-Ruba’i. CF had originally shut the newspaper down based on advice from government officials but then reopened the newspaper at a later time. Al-Ruba’i was the personal secretary of Muhammad Baqir Sadr and is a well respected individual. Al-Ruba’i began publishing writings against MAS which resulted in MAS shutting the Hawza newspaper down. If CF approached Al-Ruba’i about reopening the newspaper there is a potential anti MAS platform with wide distribution.

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Tactical Interrogation Report

FROM: Shi’a SDE
TO: Coalition Forces

SUBJ: TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT

Name of Detainee: Qayis Hadi Sa’id ((Al-Khazali))
Report No: 200243-012
Alias: None
Shayikh: Unknown
Category: 2A
Captive Tag #: 1.4(a)
Date of Capture: 20 0100 MAR 07
Interrogator: 3.5(c)
Date/Time: 26 2200 JUN 07
Language Used: AD
Interpreter: 3.5(c)
Maps Used: None
Significance: Detainee is a suspected anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) group leader, and is associated with weapons smuggling from Iran, extra judicial killing (EJK) activity, and involvement with the attack on the Karbala PJCC.

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Summary:

- Detainee discussed plan to preach against Muqtada Al-Sadr in prison

Detainee does not want other detainees to know that he is cooperating with CF but is willing to talk with other detainees about how they are suffering in prison for the mistakes that Muqtada Al-Sadr (MAS) has made, how MAS does not care about them being in prison, and how MAS will not focus any attention on them getting out of prison. Detainee will divide the detainees he speaks with into three groups and report their progress back to the interrogator. The first group will include detainees who are in agreement with Detainee; supporters speaking against MAS and understand that CF do not have a desire to stay in Iraq which negates them as being considered an occupying force. The second group does not totally agree, but Detainee sees potential in working with them to change their views. The third group will include all other detainees that are not working
with Detainee and are useless to the efforts. In order to maintain Detainee’s influence, he cannot be seen as a cooperator of CF so he requests one method of verifying progress with detainees through indirect questioning to elicit their perception of CF and MAS.

Some Shi’a groups are making kidnapping a common activity in order to get rich. They initially targeted wealthy Sunnis but most of them have fled the country so they began targeting Shi’a. Additionally, they have kidnapped for political reasons in order to seek revenge against the Sunnis and Americans.

Sgt Al-Taei left the green zone on a motorcycle in civilian clothes. The kidnapping group thought that he was a contractor and kidnapped him. He was taken to Sadr City which was later placed under siege by CF. The kidnapping group got scared and wanted to kill Al-Taei but instead turned him over to Detainee. Detainee placed Al-Taei with a group that he has influence over in order to keep him safe. The group he placed Al-Taei with wants to trade him for the release of a Sadrist like Ahmad Al-Shaybani. Detainee is not willing to give a name for a point of contact to reach the group but reiterated his efforts through the internet with the previous interrogator. Detainee also suggested releasing his brother Layth to go and speak with the group in order to arrange for Al-Taei’s release. Detainee does not know the original group members who actually kidnapped Al-Taei but he knows they are associated with Mustafah Al-Bahadilli.
Shi’a SDE
Tactical Interrogation Report

FROM: Shi’a SDE
TO: Coalition Forces

SUBJ: TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT

Name of Detainee: Qayis Hadi Sa’id ((Al-Khazali))
Report No: 200243-013
Alias: None
Shayikh: Unknown
Category: 2A
Captive Tag #: 1.4(a)
Date of Capture: 20 0100 MAR 07
Interrogator: 3.5(c)
Date/Time: 27 1730 JUN 07
Language Used: AD
Interpreter: 3.5(c)
Maps Used: None
Significance: Detainee is a suspected anti-Iraqi forces (AlF) group leader, and is associated with weapons smuggling from Iran, extra judicial killing (EJK) activity, and involvement with the attack on the Karbala PJCC.

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Summary:

- This session focused on Kidnapping

The focus of this interrogation was once again Sgt Al-Taei. Detainee came up with an alternative plan that involved speaking with one of the other Detainees that he was captured with and explaining how to get in contact with the right people. Detainee still refuses to give interrogator names for any of the people that may be contacted but is willing to give instructions and names to another Iraqi being released. Detainee also reiterated his desire to release Layth for a two to three day period with the promise that Layth will return within that time accompanied by Al-Taei. If Layth cannot locate him then he will bring back anyone who refuses to give Al-Taei up. In addition, Layth will also bring back a file containing information on AQIZ personnel associated with his brother’s kidnapping. This file was previously discussed and contains detailed information
on Tawheed-Wa-Al-Jihad (TWJ) members, the location of an AQIZ prison, names, along with descriptions and addresses of TWJ members.

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Shi’a SDE
Tactical Interrogation Report

FROM: Shi’a SDE
TO: Coalition Forces

SUBJ: TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT

Name of Detainee: Qayis Hadi Sa’id ((Al-Khazali))
Report No: 200243-014
Alias: None
Shayikh: Unknown
Category: 2A
Captive Tag #: 1.4(a)
Date of Capture: 20 0100 MAR 07
Interrogator: 3.5(a)
Date/Time: 28 1730 JUN 07
Language Used: AD
Interpreter: 3.5(c)
Maps Used: None
Significance: Detainee is a suspected anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) group leader, and is associated with weapons smuggling from Iran, extra judicial killing (EJK) activity, and involvement with the attack on the Karkala PJCC.

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Summary:

- This session focused on Kidnapping

Detainee was not aware of Ronald Withrow’s kidnapping, but based on the area he was kidnapped from Detainee suspects the operation was carried out by Sayid Naji’s group in Basrah. Sayid Naji is a follower of Jalil Al-Nuri. Sayid Naji is currently in CF custody and Detainee does not know who replaced Sayid Naji when he was captured.

Detainee and Jalil al Nuri do not have a good relationship. They both went to the same high school and university but continued down separate paths when Detainee went to the Hawza. As Detainee moved up through the ranks and
became close to the Martyred Sadr, Jalil Al-Nuri became jealous. After the fall of the regime, Jalil Al-Nuri began speaking against Detainee.

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Shi’a SDE
Tactical Interrogation Report

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TO: Coalition Forces

SUBJ: TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT

Name of Detainee: Qayis Hadi Sa’id ((Al-Khazali))
Report No: 200243-015
Alias: None
Shayikh: Unknown
Category: 2A
Captive Tag #: 1.4(a)
Date of Capture: 20 0100 MAR 07
Interrogator: 3.5(0)
Date/Time: 01 1530 JUL 07
Language Used: AD
Interpreter: 3.5(c)
Maps Used: None

Significance: Detainee is a suspected anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) group leader, and is associated with weapons smuggling from Iran, extra judicial killing (EJK) activity, and involvement with the attack on the Karbala PJCC.

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Summary:

- Detainee discussed recruiting for Special Groups
- Detainee discussed purpose for initial training

Special Groups members are selected based on their religious faith and their credibility with the people. Those who wish to join Special Groups must know someone in the group who will vouch for them. They must be strong in their religious faith and attend mosque regularly. The people of the community must respect that person and speak well of him. Prior military training and experience are a plus but they are not common anymore. For that reason the new recruits are trained to reach a new level of expertise in Iran. There is no special religious training for Special Groups members; they attend mosque with all other JAM members.
New recruits are given training inside of Iraq which covers everything possible except actually firing weapons. They are taught how to disassemble and reassemble weapons, firing methods and other basic skills. Because the Shi’a communities are small and crowded there is no place for the recruits to actually fire weapons so Iran is where they are trained for that.

New recruits to Special Groups are taken to Iran for an initial training course or for a specialty training course; the training in Iran lasts one month. Initial training is for the new recruits who have no experience or very little experience in a particular field. They are given training on multiple weapons types from light, heavy, crew served and IED’s. After the initial training is complete, the new recruits return to Iraq to use their new skills in operations with Special Groups. Some recruits pickup the training very well and become experts in multiple weapons without any further training. Others need to identify one weapon they want to work with and then will return to Iran for more advanced training. Of course there are also people identified to receive training on particular weapons based on Special Groups operational needs.

The new recruits who have experience in a particular weapons system like Mortars or IED’s will go to Iran for advanced training on those systems as opposed to attending the regular initial training. This will make them an expert on those weapons so they can return to Special Groups in Iraq for operations.

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Shi’a SDE
Tactical Interrogation Report

FROM: Shi’a SDE
TO: Coalition Forces

SUBJ: TACTICAL INTERROGATION REPORT

Name of Detainee: Qayis Hadi Sa’id ((Al-Khazali))
Report No: 200243-016
Alias: None
Shayikh: Unknown
Category: 2A
Captive Tag #: 1.4(e)
Date of Capture: 200100 MAR 07
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Date/Time: 041330 JUL 07
Language Used: AD
Interpreter: 3.5(c)
Maps Used: None

Significance: Detainee is a suspected anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) group leader, and is associated with weapons smuggling from Iran, extra judicial killing (EJK) activity, and involvement with the attack on the Karbala PJCC.

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Summary:
- Detainee discussed communications for Special Groups
- Detainee discussed transporting weapons across border

Special Groups is divided into three regions; Southern, Central and Baghdad. There is minimal communication between regions but when it occurs it is done by cell phone. The regional commanders would call Detainee in the event of an emergency where they needed spiritual advice, weapons or something important but otherwise did not make any contact. They would make contact by mobile phone either calling or sending a text message.

Each of the three regional commanders had a point of contact with Abu Sajjad Al-Gharrawi to order weapons. Gharrawi has been running a smuggling network across the Iran-Iraq border since early 1980’s during Saddam’s Regime.
brings things through the marshes that run from Al-Amarrah to Al-Basrah; Detainee calls this entire area Ahvaz on the Iranian side. Gharrawi’s primary means of transportation is a long wooden boat otherwise known as a Shaktura. There is no set time for the shipments to be made as there is a lookout on each side of the border who keep in communication with one another to determine when and where the safest time is to transport goods across. These lookouts advise the smugglers on the location of border patrol and the amount of time they may have to get products across. The smugglers use this information to determine the load size they can transport. Gharrawi has helped Al-Fadhila, Badr, JAM, and Mustafa Al-Shaybani smuggle weapons across the border. Badr smugglers also use the area along the border near Badrah and Jassan, IZ.

Shayikh Ja’bar and Shayikh Muhammad Al-Sa’adi have been officially in charge of the council that leads JAM and Special Groups for about a year now. Detainee is no longer officially in charge but he is more respected and often consulted more by the three regional leaders than Ja’bar or Sa’adi.

Approximately 90% of the leadership in JAM and Special Groups respect Detainee more than MAS while most normal JAM members respect MAS more. This was the reason that MAS replaced Detainee on the council that oversees the OMS offices, JAM and Special Groups - fear and jealousy.

MAS attempted to setup the Golden Brigades in the past but was not successful in doing so. ‘Abbas Al-Khufi was in charge of the battalions at that time but he fled Iraq and went to Syria. Because many people do not like him and he fell out of favor with MAS, Detainee does not believe he would return to Iraq. Detainee does not believe Ahmad Shaybani would return to Iraq and attempt in setting this Brigade up because he is fearful of being captured.

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